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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #7812-83
31 October 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Major General Edward B. Akteson, USA
National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces

SUBJECT : Talking Points for Discussion with General Wickham 25X1

1. There are three priority issues which I recommend for discussion with General Wickham at breakfast on 1 November 1983:

- Warning of war in Korea.
- Intelligence support to NATO.
- Intelligence support to the Grenada operation. 25X1

2. General Wickham was the US commander in Korea from July 1979 to June 1982. He has a good feel for the brittle nature of the truce in Korea. Last April, in response to our US-ROK "Team Spirit" exercise, North Korean forces assumed virtual full wartime readiness. More recently, in the wake of the bombing of senior ROK officials in Burma, they again went to a high state of alert, although there did not appear to be quite as complete activation of support elements. As pointed out in the attached extract from NIE 14.2/42-83, "Warning of War in Korea," the likelihood of lengthy warning before an attack across the DMZ is quite low (Tab A). Questions for General Wickham are:

- In the wake of the KAL flight 007 shootdown and the bomb incident, does General Wickham sense any significant change in the threat of war on the Korean Peninsula?
- Is there anything the US can reasonably do in coming months to improve our capabilities for providing warning of North Korean attack?
- What are the prospects for improved Japanese/ROK relations at the military-to-military level? 25X1

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3. Admiral Burkhalter will join Generals Stilwell, Faurer and Williams in examining issues surrounding US intelligence support to NATO. You looked into the matter during the your trip to Europe in November 1982 and reported your findings to Secretary Weinberger (Tab B). Key points in your letter which would be of high interest to General Wickham were:

- Both CIA and the Community need to reexamine capabilities for responding to theater requirements for intelligence in both peace and war.
- "Staybehind" programs in Western Europe have both deterrent and war-fighting value.
- The Army should expand its clandestine HUMINT program in Europe.
- Ground intelligence mechanisms for support to NATO are not nearly as well developed as are air intelligence mechanisms (e.g., Tactical Fusion Center and Combat Operations Intelligence Center). We must develop the means for rapidly inputting US ground intelligence both to NATO and to allied national field headquarters in wartime. Sensitive sources and methods must be protected, but the mechanisms for support must be designed and emplaced before the war breaks out.
- An inhibitant to development of adequate intelligence support to NATO is the doctrine of intelligence as a "national responsibility." Our allies have nothing comparable to our national collection and assessment systems. We should reexamine the suitability of the doctrine for wartime operations in light of the great discrepancies between the various national capabilities-- particularly those between the US and all of the others.

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
4. The Intelligence Community has just completed a preliminary assessment of Cuban and Soviet involvement in Grenada. In light of discrepancies noted in the numbers and military effectiveness of Cuban and Grenadian forces encountered in the operation in comparison with order-of-battle holdings prior to D-Day (Tab C), we should undertake a postmortem examination of the quality of our intelligence support to the Joint Task Force. It appears at this juncture that the forces initially designated for securing the Salines airfield and the city of St. Georges may have been inadequate. Questions to put to General Wickham are:

- Does General Wickham believe that the forces designated for the initial assault were adequate for the task?
- What are General Wickham's views on the quality of intelligence available to planners at OJCS and LANTCOM?

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- If it was not the best, how could it have been improved?
- Does General Wickham suggest any modifications in the way we now provide national intelligence to operational commanders?



Edward B. Atkeson

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Attachments:


Tab A - NIE 14.2/42-83

Key Judgments



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B - DCI Ltr. to SECDEF, dtd. 9 Dec 82

C - Comparison of Estimates of CubanPersonnel in Grenada, dtd. 30 Oct 83

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31 October 1983MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI
DDCI

FROM : NIO/GPF

SUBJECT : Talking Points for Discussion with General Wickham 25X1

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